Luck Egalitarianism by Lippert-Rasmussen Kasper

Author:Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Bloomsbury UK
Published: 2015-03-14T16:00:00+00:00

5.4. The levelling down objection

In recent years many have expressed scepticism about egalitarianism by appealing to the levelling down objection. Most assume that, unlike deontic egalitarianism, telic egalitarianism is vulnerable to the levelling down objection. In this section, I explain this objection. Section 5.5 challenges the view that all forms of telic egalitarianisms are vulnerable to the levelling down objection. Section 5.6 argues that at least some forms of deontic egalitarianism are vulnerable to the levelling down objection, if some forms of telic egalitarianism are. Together these claims imply that, unlike what is commonly assumed, telic and deontic egalitarianism are symmetrically positioned relative to levelling down objections. This makes it even more urgent for luck egalitarians to respond to the levelling down objection, so Section 5.7 surveys some of the main responses to the objection.

To see the force of the levelling down objection, suppose we can bring about either one of the following two alternative distributions:

E: Everyone at some level.

I: Some at this level. Others better off. (Parfit 2002: 111)

In I there is inequality, but this inequality is bad for no one, since everyone is at least as well off in I as in E. However, if one holds, as telic egalitarians do, that inequality is unjust in itself, at least when resulting from differential luck, then one seems committed to the view that I is worse than E in one respect at least, i.e. from the point of view of egalitarian justice.

Deontic egalitarians might respond to the levelling down objection by pointing out that their view does not commit them to any claims about which of the two outcomes is better. All they claim is that justice requires that people are treated equally and this in itself does not commit them to the view that I is in any respect worse than E.

While this reply seems cogent, it gets deontic egalitarians off the hook too easily. Are they not committed to saying that in bringing about I rather than E one does not treat people equally and, if so, is this implication not just as problematic as the telic egalitarians’ assessment of I being bad in one respect? I return to this question in Section 5.6, but to see its force suppose we can bring about two variants of I: one where one half of the population is better off and another where the other half of the population is better off. Suppose we cannot choose between these two variants through a lottery device, but must simply decide which people we should make better off. Is it not plausible to say that deontic egalitarians are committed to the view that we do not treat the people whom we do not make better off equally and, thus, in one respect unjustly? And is this commitment not implausible given that the alternative to making some people better off is to make no one better off?

Return to telic egalitarians. They need not say that I is all things considered worse than E.

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